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The target article by Rowan and colleagues, on the history, science, and politics of animal
sentience is remarkable in every respect. Their history of the problem and of its treatment
delivers some important and often ignored facts. No, it is not true that the idea that animals
can suffer is a modern scientific conclusion: in 1789 Jeremy Bentham formulated a precise
question on this topic and the answer unequivocally suggested that they did. Nor should we
insist on blaming Descartes and his idea of animals as automata for rejecting animal
sentience, when we have more recent examples of insidious denials. A case in point can be
found in the writings of the otherwise admirable William James, one of my intellectual heroes.
At the dawn of the 20th century, he was sweeping aside the entire notion of consciousness as
something medieval (James, 1904).
On the science of animal sentience, Rowan et al’s views are impeccable. I found their
conception of consciousness modern and physiologically sound. Homeostatic feelings
provide sentient animals with precious information about their internal environment — via
feelings such as thirst, hunger and pain — and the information they provide can be used to
guide behaviour consciously and efficiently. This is the specific idea that we have been
defending over the past few years (Damasio, 2018; Damasio, 2021; Damasio & Damasio, 2022
a and b), and that supports our contention that feelings of the homeostatic variety were
selected in evolution because of the value that their specific conscious information delivered
to the creatures so endowed.
I also note that Rowan et al realize that the information provided by homeostatic
feelings pertains not only to negative and risky physiological conditions — signified by pain
and suffering, for example — but also to “opportunity situations”, those that can lead
organisms to explore their environment and draw benefits from the consequences of the
exploration (see Widowski and Duncan, 2000 & Damasio & Damasio, 2022a,b). To close the
circle, such benefits include yet another series of feelings such as pleasure and well-being.
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The question of when sentience emerged in the phylogenetic scale is delicate. Rowan
et al deal cautiously with the issue and I suspect that they do not endorse Arthur Reber’s
extreme view. I believe Reber, 2016 and Reber, Baluška & Miller (2022 this issue), are too
generous when they write that ALL living organisms, from bacteria to humans, have “valenced
experiences, i.e. feelings”. I very much respect these colleagues, but as I have argued
elsewhere (Damasio, 2022), I do not see how organisms without nervous systems can
construct maps and representations of their own states -- something I believe is necessary as
a foundation for feeling experiences (Damasio & Damasio, 2022a,b). I note that organisms
such as bacteria can sense/detect stimuli and respond to them but they lack the physiological
equipment necessary for generating representations which we regard as essential to feelings.
This is not to say that a precursor regulatory process would not be capable of guiding
behaviour based on particular cells and chemical molecules. The point is that such a process
would not operate with the support of feelings, experience and consciousness.
A remarkable section of Rowan et al’s target article deals specifically with the reality
of consciousness in humans and in mammals and emphasizes a solid piece of evidence. As
those of us who have practiced neurology in humans know, focal structural damage to the
cerebral cortices does not cause coma, whereas damage to the upper and posterior brainstem
nuclei does (Parvizi & Damasio, 2001; Parvizi & Damasio, 2003). This incontrovertible fact
reveals that damage to the most advanced sectors of the human brain, namely, the
neocortical component of the cerebral cortices, is compatible with the preservation of
consciousness, while damage to the upper brainstem is not. These findings deal a direct blow
to the idea that consciousness would depend preferentially on the most advanced structures
and processes of nervous systems. That is definitely not the case.
A thoughtful document built around some of these specific facts was discussed at the
Francis Crick Memorial Conference on Consciousness in Human and Non-Human Animals,
held in Cambridge, UK in 2012. The document was presented to the audience with the idea
that those in agreement should subscribe to it. Unfortunately, and sadly, although the facts
were solid and the intentions laudable, this document – now called The Cambridge
Declaration on Consciousness – was only signed by a minority of those present.

Editor’s Note: Simultaneously with the Crick Memorial Conference on Consciousness in
Human and Non-Human Animals, taking place in Cambridge (July 7, 2012), the Summer
School on the Evolution and Function of Consciousness (52 papers) was taking place at
UQAM in Montreal (June 29 - July 11, 2012), at which Antonio Damasio was one of the
speakers. A second Summer School, The Other-Minds Problem: Animal Sentience and
Cognition (48 videos), took place at UQAM in Montreal (June 26 – July 6, 2018).

References
Bentham, J. 1789 (1970). An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Eds J.H. Burns &
H.L.A. Hart, p. xliii. Athlone Press, London.
Cambridge Declaration (2012) The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness.
Damasio, A. (2022). Perspectives on the Cognitive Unconscious, In: A. Reber & R. Allen (Eds.), The
Cognitive Unconscious: The First-Half Century, Oxford University Press.

2

Animal Sentience 2022.443: Damasio on Rowan et al on Sentience Politics

Damasio, A. (2018). The Strange Order of Things: Life, Feeling and the Making of Cultures. Pantheon,
New York.
Damasio, A. (2021). Feeling & Knowing: Making Minds Conscious. Pantheon, New York.
Damasio, A. & Damasio, H. (2022). Homeostatic feelings and the biology of consciousness.BRAIN, 00,
1-5.
Damasio, A. & Damasio, H. (2022). Feelings are the source of consciousness. Neural Computation (in
press).
James, W. (1904). Does 'Consciousness' Exist? The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific
Methods, 1(18), 477-491
Parvizi, J. & Damasio, A.R. (2001). Consciousness and the brainstem. Cognition, 79(1), 135-160.
Parvizi, J. & Damasio, A.R. (2003). Neuroanatomical correlates of brainstem coma. Brain, 126(7),
1524-1536.
Reber, A.S. (2016). Caterpillars, consciousness and the origins of mind. Animal Sentience, 11(1)
Reber, A.S., Baluška, F. & Miller, W.B. (2022). All living organisms are sentient. Animal Sentience,
31(3).
Rowan, AN; D'Silva, JM; Duncan, IJHH.; & Palmer, N (2021) Animal sentience: history, science, and
politics. Animal Sentience 31(1)
Widowski, T.M. & Duncan, I.J.H. (2000). Working for a dustbath: are hens increasing pleasure rather
than reducing suffering? Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci. 68, 39-53.

3

